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Abstract
Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are
presented. In the results, dual games and the self-duality of the value implicitly play an
important role. A set of non-cooperative games which implement the Shapley value on the
class of all games is given.
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1 Introduction
Axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) have been studied by many
researchers. For example, Shapley (1953), Myerson (1980), Young (1985), Hart and Mas-Colell
(1989), Chun (1989), Hamiache (2001) and Brink (2001) characterized it on the class of all
games. On subclasses of games, Dubey (1975) characterized it on the class of simple games
and Neyman (1989) showed that the set of axioms used in the original Shapley’s axiomatic
characterizations also characterize the Shapley value on the additive class spanned by a single
game.
Those various characterizations give us new viewpoints of the Shapley value. For instance,
by consistency used in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), the Shapley value is represented in a recur-
sive manner (see Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) and Maschler and Owen (1989)). In addition, by
the recursive representation, P´ erez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) construct a non-cooperative
game whose subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀs coincide with the Shapley value. The non-
cooperative game is called the bidding mechanism.
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1In this paper, we give some new axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley value. Given a
cooperative game and a coalition, we deﬁne two modiﬁed games: the marginal game and the
extended marginal game. The two games diﬀer only in the player set. For the two games, we
give some new axioms related to the balanced contributions property. The marginal games are
closely related to the dual games; hence, in our results, the dual games and the self-duality
of the value implicitly play an important role. By our axiomatic characterizations, some new
recursive formulas for the Shapley value are given. One of the recursive formulas can be seen as
a dual game representation of the above mentioned recursive formula. Moreover, we give a set
of non-cooperative games which implement the Shapley value as subgame perfect equilibrium
payoﬀs on the class of all games. That game is a modiﬁcation of the bidding mechanism and
the diﬀerence is that when someone rejects the oﬀer made by a proposer, the remaining players
play the marginal game instead of just a subgame.
The paper is organized as follows. Notations and deﬁnitions are presented in Section 2. The
axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley value are given in Section 3. The recursive formulas
of the Shapley value are provided in Section 4. The implementation of the Shapley value is
presented in Section 5. Further discussions are included in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
A pair (N,v) is a cooperative game or a TU game where N ⊆ N is a ﬁnite set of players and
v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0 is a characteristic function. Let |N| = n where | · | represents the
cardinality of a set. A subset S of N is called a coalition. For any S ⊆ N, v(S) represents the
worth of the coalition. For simplicity, each singleton is represented as i instead of {i} when
there exists no fear of confusion. For any S ⊆ N, the subgame of (N,v) on S is a pair (S,v|S)
where v|S(T) = v(T) for any T ⊆ S.
Let G be a set of all cooperative games. A value is a mapping from G into |N|-dimensional
vector (xi)i∈N that satisﬁes
∑
i∈N xi = v(N). One of the well-known values on the class of
cooperative games is the Shapley value introduced by Shapley (1953). Let π be a permutation
on N and Π be a set of all permutations on N. Given (N,v) ∈ G, the Shapley value ϕ(N,v) is







v({j|π(j) ≤ π(i)}) − v({j|π(j) < π(i)})
)
.
The Shapley value satisﬁes the following balanced contributions property (see Myerson (1980)):
For any i,j ∈ N with i ̸= j,
ϕi(N,v) − ϕi(N\j,v) = ϕj(N,v) − ϕj(N\i,v).
The dual game (N,v∗) of (N,v) is the game that assigns to each coalition S ⊆ N the worth
that is lost by the grand coalition N if S leaves N, that is, for each S ⊆ N,
v∗(S) = v(N) − v(N\S).
2A value φ is self-dual if φ(N,v) = φ(N,v∗) for each (N,v). It is well-known that the
Shapley value is self-dual.
Let S ⊆ N. The S-marginal game (N\S,vS) of (N,v) is the game that assigns to each
coalition T ⊆ N\S the worth of T ∪ S minus the worth of S, that is, for each T ⊆ N\S,
vS(T) = v(S ∪ T) − v(S).
In the S-marginal game, any subset of N\S can win the cooperation of S by paying the value
v(S) to S.
Between the dual games and the marginal games, the following holds.
Proposition 1. For any S ⊆ N, it holds vS = (v∗|N\S)∗.
Proof. For any S ⊆ N and any T ⊆ N\S,
(v∗|N\S)∗(T) = v∗(N\S) − v∗(N\S\T)
= v(N) − v(S) − v(N) + v(S ∪ T)
= vS(T).
A dummy coalition S of (N,v) is a coalition that satisﬁes the following condition: for any
T ⊆ N\S, v(S ∪T) = v(S)+v(T). In particular, if S is a singleton, we call it a dummy player.
Let S ⊆ N. The extended S-marginal game (N, ¯ vS) of (N,v) is the game that assigns to
each coalition T ⊆ N the worth of T ∪ S minus the worth of T\S, that is, for each T ⊆ N,
¯ vS(T) = v(S ∪ T) − v(S\T).
By deﬁnition, given (N,v) ∈ G and S ⊆ N, for any T ⊆ N\S,
¯ vS(T ∪ S) = v(S ∪ T) − v(∅)
= v(S ∪ T) − v(S) + v(S) − v(∅)
= v(S ∪ T) − v(S\T) + v(S ∪ S) − v(S\S)
= ¯ vS(T) + ¯ vS(S).
Thus, S is a dummy coalition of (N, ¯ vS). Moreover,
¯ vS|N\S(T) = v(S ∪ T) − v(S) = vS(T),
that is, the diﬀerence between the extended S-marginal game and the S-marginal game is
whether or not a dummy coalition S is included in the player set. For the Shapley value of the
two games, the following holds.
Proposition 2. Given (N,v) ∈ G, for any S ⊆ N and any i ∈ N,




ϕi(S,v) if i ∈ S
ϕi(N\S,vS) if i ̸∈ S.
3Proof. Given (N,v) ∈ G and S ⊆ N, let
wS(T) = v(S) − v(S\T)
and
uS(T) = v(S ∪ T) − v(S)
for any T ⊆ N. Then, wS + uS = ¯ vS. By additivity of the Shapley value,
ϕ(N, ¯ vS) = ϕ(N,wS) + ϕ(N,uS).
By deﬁnition, any i ̸∈ S is a null player in (N,wS) and any player i ∈ S is a null player in
(N,uS), respectively.1 The null player property of the Shapley value implies that




ϕi(N,wS) if i ∈ S
ϕi(N,uS) if i ̸∈ S.
By the fact that any null player in (N,v) is also a null player in any subgame of (N,v), the null
player property and the balanced contributions property, we obtain that for any player i ∈ N
and any null player j ̸= i,
ϕi(N,v) − ϕi(N\j,v) = ϕj(N,v) − ϕj(N\i,v) = 0 − 0 = 0,
which implies ϕi(N,v) = ϕi(N\j,v) for any i ̸= j when j is a null player, that is, in the Shapley
value, any null player has no eﬀect on the other players.
By deﬁnition,
(wS|S)∗(T) = wS(S) − wS(S\T) = v(S) − v(S\S) − v(S) + v(S\(S\T)) = v(T)
for any T ⊆ S and uS(T) = vS(T) for any T ⊆ N\S. Thus, for any i ∈ S, since any j ∈ N\S
is a null player in (N,wS),
ϕi(N,wS) = ϕi(S,wS|S) = ϕi(S,(wS|S)∗) = ϕi(S,v),
and for any i ∈ N\S, since any j ∈ S is a null player in (N,uS),
ϕi(N,uS) = ϕi(N\S,uS|N\S) = ϕi(N\S,vS).
3 Axiomatizations
By using the marginal games, the Shapley value is axiomatized in the following way. Let φ be
a value for cooperative games.
Balanced M-contributions property: For each (N,v) ∈ G and any i,j ∈ N with i ̸= j,
φi(N,v) − φi(N\j,vj) = φj(N,v) − φj(N\i,vi).
1A null player in the game (N,v) is a player i ∈ N that satisﬁes v(S) = v(S\i) for any S ⊆ N.
4Theorem 1. The Shapley value is the unique value which satisﬁes the balanced M-contributions
property.
Proof. First, we show that the Shapley value satisﬁes the balanced M-contributions property.
In the case of |N| = 1 this is obvious. Let |N| ≥ 2. For any i,j ∈ N with i ̸= j, by the fact that
the Shapley value is self-dual, satisﬁes the balanced contributions property and by Proposition
1,
ϕi(N,v) − ϕj(N,v) = ϕi(N,v∗) − ϕj(N,v∗)
= ϕi(N\j,v∗) − ϕj(N\i,v∗)
= ϕi(N\j,(v∗|N\j)∗) − ϕj(N\i,(v∗|N\i)∗)
= ϕi(N\j,vj) − ϕj(N\i,vi).
For the uniqueness, we use the induction with respect to the number of players. Let φ be a
value on the class of cooperative games. In the case of |N| = 1, φi(N,v) = v(i) = ϕi(N,v) for
i ∈ N. If |N| = 2, by the balanced M-contributions property,
φi(N,v) − φj(N,v) = φi(N\j,vj) − φj(N\i,vi)
= v(N) − v(j) − v(N) + v(i)
= v(i) − v(j),
which implies
φi(N,v) =
v(N) + v(i) − v(j)
2
and φj(N,v) =
v(N) − v(i) + v(j)
2
.
This is exactly the Shapley value of (N,v).
Let n ≥ 2 and suppose φ = ϕ in case of there are less than n players. Consider the case
of n players. Fix i ∈ N; by the balanced M-contributions property and the supposition above,
for any j ∈ N\i,
φi(N,v) − φj(N,v) = φi(N\j,vj) − φj(N\i,vi)
= ϕi(N\j,vj) − ϕj(N\i,vi)
= ϕi(N,v) − ϕj(N,v).
Summing up the above equalities over j ∈ N\i, we obtain
(n − 1)φi(N,v) −
∑
j∈N\i





nφi(N,v) − v(N) = nϕi(N,v) − v(N).
Since n ≥ 2, φi(N,v) = ϕi(N,v). For any j ∈ N, φj(N,v) = ϕj(N,v) in the same manner.
Hence, φ = ϕ in the case of n players.
By using the extended marginal games instead of the marginal games, the following is
obtained.
5Balanced EM-contributions property: For each (N,v) ∈ G and any i,j ∈ N with i ̸= j,
φi(N,v) − φi(N, ¯ vj) = φj(N,v) − φj(N, ¯ vi).
Dummy invariance: For each (N,v) ∈ G, any dummy player j ∈ N of (N,v) and any
i ∈ N\j,
φi(N,v) = φi(N\j,v).
Theorem 2. The Shapley value is the unique value which satisﬁes the balanced EM-contributions
property and dummy invariance.
Proof. First, we show that the Shapley value satisﬁes the balanced EM-contributions property
and dummy invariance, respectively. In the case that |N| = 1 this is obvious. If |N| ≥ 2, for
any i,j ∈ N with i ̸= j, by Proposition 2 and Theorem 1,
ϕi(N,v) − ϕi(N, ¯ vj) = ϕi(N,v) − ϕi(N\j,vj)
= ϕj(N,v) − ϕj(N\i,vi)
= ϕj(N,v) − ϕj(N, ¯ vi).
By the fact that a dummy player j of (N,v) is also a dummy player of (N\i,v), for any i ̸= j,
and since the Shapley value satisﬁes the dummy player property and the balanced contributions
property, we have
ϕi(N,v) − ϕi(N\j,v) = ϕj(N,v) − ϕj(N\i,v) = v(j) − v(j) = 0,
which implies dummy invariance.
For the uniqueness, let φ be a value which satisﬁes the two axioms. In the case when
|N| = 1, φi(N,v) = v(i) = ϕi(N,v) for i ∈ N. If |N| ≥ 2, for any i,j ∈ N with i ̸= j, the
dummy invariance together with the balanced EM-contributions property imply,
φi(N,v) − φi(N\j,vj) = φi(N,v) − φi(N, ¯ vj)
= φj(N,v) − φj(N, ¯ vi)
= φj(N,v) − φj(N\i,vi).
Thus, the value which satisﬁes dummy invariance and the balanced EM-contributions property
must satisﬁes the balanced M-contributions property. By Theorem 1, the uniqueness is shown.
For the independence of the two axioms, we consider the values χ1 and χ2 deﬁned by for






v(N) if i = minj∈N j








|N\D| if i is not a dummy player of (N,v)
0 if i is a dummy player of (N,v),
6where D is a set of all dummy players in (N,v). It is easy to show that χ1 satisﬁes the balanced
EM-contributions property but not dummy invariance and that χ2 satisﬁes dummy invariance
but not the balanced EM-contributions property.
The following is obtained as a corollary of Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. The Shapley value is the unique value which satisﬁes dummy invariance, addi-
tivity and the following property: For each (N,v) ∈ G and any i,j ∈ N with i ̸= j,
φi(N,v − ¯ vj) = φj(N,v − ¯ vi),
where for any S ⊆ N, (v − ¯ vk)(S) = v(S) − ¯ vk(S) for k = i,j.
4 Recursive formulas
It is well-known that the Shapley value is characterized in the following recursive manner. (See










By using the (extended) marginal games, we give other recursive representations of the Shapley
value as follows.







































We notice that Proposition 3 can be seen as the particular case of the following Proposition
4 when r = 1.
















7Proof. Let r = |R| be ﬁxed, where R ⊆ N. Let ΠR = {π ∈ Π|π(j) ≤ r for each j ∈ R}. Then
for any R ̸= R′ which satisfy |R| = |R′| = r, we have ΠR ∩ ΠR′
= ∅ and
∪


























































The following is obtained as a corollary of Propositions 2 and 4.










In this section, given a cooperative game, we consider a non-cooperative game which implements
the Shapley value of the cooperative game as equilibrium payoﬀs. In that non-cooperative
game, the marginal games and the recursive formula we mentioned in the previous section play
important roles.
Given a cooperative game (N,v) ∈ G, the non-cooperative game Γ(N,v) is deﬁned in the
following recursive manner.
In case |N| = 1, player i ∈ N obtains v(i) and the game is over.
Assume that the non-cooperative game is known when there are less than n players. We
deﬁne the case where there are n players.
t=1 Each player i ∈ N makes bids bi
j ∈ R for every j ̸= i.
For each i ∈ N, the net bid Bi is the sum of the bids he made minus the sum of the bids







i. Let α = argmaxiBi, where in
the case of multiple maximizers, one of them is randomly chosen. The chosen player α
pays bα
j to every player j ̸= α.
t=2 Player α makes an oﬀer xα
j ∈ R to every player j ∈ N\α.
8t=3 Players in N\α respond to the oﬀer in a sequential manner, say (j1,...,jn−1). An order
of the players makes no matter. Response is either “accept it” or “reject it”.
In case player jh accepts the oﬀer, the next player jh+1 responds to it. If every jh accepts
the oﬀer, the players come to an agreement. If there is some rejection, an agreement is
not reached.
When an agreement is reached, proposer α pays the proposed payoﬀ xj for any j ∈ N\α















Then the game is over.
On the other hand, when an agreement is not reached, the proposer is weakly split oﬀ by
the other players. He leaves the game with obtaining v(α). Then, the remaining players
N\α continue a non-cooperative game Γ(N\α,vα).
This non-cooperative game is inspired by the bidding mechanism presented in P´ erez-Castrillo
and Wettstein (2001). The diﬀerence between the above mentioned non-cooperative game and
the biding mechanism is what will happen when someone rejects an oﬀer. In our games, in
the case of rejection, the proposer α is weakly split oﬀ by the other players and the remaining
players play the α-marginal game (N\α,vα), while in the bidding mechanism, the proposer
just leaves the game and the remaining players play just the subgame (N\α,v).
We obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Γ(N,v) produces the Shapley value payoﬀ for (N,v) in any subgame perfect
equilibrium.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction with respect to the number of players. If |N| = 1,
the Shapley value is equal to the value of his stand-alone coalition; hence, the theorem holds.
Assume that the theorem holds in case there are less than n players and consider the case when
there are n players.
First, we show that there exists an SPE whose payoﬀ coincides with the Shapley value of
the game (N,v). Consider the following strategy for each player.
t=1 Each player i ∈ N announces bi
j = ϕj(N,v) − ϕj(N\i,vi) for every j ̸= i.
t=2 A proposer α oﬀers xα
j = ϕj(N\α,vα) for every j ∈ N\α.
t=3 A responder j accepts the oﬀer if xα
j = ϕj(N\α,vα) and rejects it otherwise.
9If all players take the above strategies, an agreement is formed at t=3 and the game is over.
It is clear that the above strategy proﬁle yields the Shapley value for any player who is not the
proposer α since bα
j + xα








j̸=α ϕj(N,v) = ϕi(N,v). Note that all players obtain their Shapley value
whether or not the player is a proposer. In other words, given the strategies, an outcome is the
same regardless of who is chosen as a proposer.
To check whether the above strategies constitute an SPE, ﬁrst, we show that the strategies
at t=3 are best responses for each of the players. Let jn−1 be the last player who has to
decide whether accept or reject the oﬀer. If no other players reject an oﬀer, player jn−1’s best
response is accept the oﬀer if xα
jn−1 = ϕjn−1(N\α,vα) and reject it otherwise.2 Knowing that
the above mentioned reaction of the last player, the second last player jn−2’s best response is
accept the oﬀer if xα
jn−2 = ϕjn−2(N\α,vα) and reject it otherwise. Using the same argument
to go backward, we can show that the strategies mentioned above constitute an SPE of the
subgame starting from t=3.
Next, we prove that the strategies at t=2 are best responses for each of them. By this
strategy, the proposer obtains v(N) −
∑
j̸=α ϕj(N\α,vα) = v(N) − vα(N\α) = v(α) in the
subgame starting from t=2. If he oﬀers some player j the value ¯ xα
j less than ϕj(N\α,vα), the
oﬀer is rejected by the player and the proposer obtains v(α) which is not strictly better oﬀ. If
he oﬀers some player j the value ˆ xα
j larger than ϕj(N\α,vα) without lowering the oﬀer to the
other players, the oﬀer is accepted but the share of the proposer is strictly worse oﬀ. Thus, the
above mentioned strategies constitute a SPE of the subgame starting from t=2.
Then, we show that the strategies t=1 are best responses for each of them. Given the













(ϕj(N,v) − ϕj(N\i,vi)) −
∑
j̸=i
(ϕi(N,v) − ϕi(N\j,vj)) = 0,
since ϕ satisﬁes the balanced M-contributions property. Hence, all players are chosen to be
a proposer with probability 1
n. As seen before, the outcome is the same regardless of who is
chosen as a proposer. Given the above mentioned strategies, consider the case that player i
changes his strategy to ¯ bi
j = bi
j + aj for each of j ̸= i. If
∑
j̸=i aj < 0, i is not chosen as a
proposer; hence, his ﬁnal payoﬀ is unchanged. If
∑
j̸=i aj = 0, i may be chosen to be a proposer.
In the case that he is not chosen as a proposer, his ﬁnal payoﬀ is unchanged. In the case that
















which means his ﬁnal payoﬀ is unchanged. If
∑
j̸=i aj > 0, i must be chosen to be a proposer.
















2Note that it is not a unique best response.
10Thus, his share is strictly worse oﬀ. Therefore, the above mentioned strategies constitute a
SPE.
Next, we prove that any SPE implements the Shapley value payoﬀ as an equilibrium out-
come by the following series of claims.
Claim 1: In any subgame starting from t=2, a proposer α obtains v(α) and each of the other
players obtains his Shapley value of the game (N\α,vα) in any SPE.
Let α be a proposer. There are two types of SPEs: (a) SPEs in which someone rejects the
oﬀer at t=3 and (b) SPEs in which players reach an agreement at t=3.
In case (a), by the deﬁnition of the non-cooperative game Γ(N,v) and the induction hy-
pothesis, α obtains v(α) and each of the other players obtains his Shapley value of the game
(N\α,vα).
By the induction hypothesis, each player j ̸= α surely obtains ϕj(N\α,vα) by rejecting
the oﬀer. Hence, in case (b), each player j ̸= α obtains not less than ϕj(N\α,vα). Thus, the
proposer α obtains at most v(α) since v(N) −
∑
j̸=α ϕj(N\α,vα) = v(N) − vα(N\α) = v(α).
But, the proposer α surely obtains v(α) when the oﬀer is rejected. Hence, he must obtain v(α)
in case (b). Therefore, the claim also holds in this case.







i = 0 for any i ∈ N.
Claim 3: In any SPE, each player’s payoﬀ is the same regardless of who is chosen as a proposer.
The above two claims are the same as Claim (c) and (d) of P´ erez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2001), and are shown in the same manner, respectively.
Claim 4: In any SPE, the ﬁnal payoﬀ coincides with the Shapley value.
Let ui





















































By Proposition 3, the right-hand side of the above equality coincides with ϕi(N,v).
116 Concluding remarks
As we mentioned before, the diﬀerence between our non-cooperative game and the bidding
mechanism is what will happen when someone rejects an oﬀer. That diﬀerence yields the
diﬀerence of the implementability of the class of games. Our non-cooperative game implements
the Shapley value as an unique equilibrium payoﬀ on the class of all games, while the bidding
mechanism works on a class of zero-monotonic games. The point is that in our non-cooperative
game, players always divide the value v(N), that is, if an oﬀer made by proposer α is rejected
at t=3, the proposer obtains v(α) and the remaining players divide the value vα(N\α) =
v(N) − v(α) among them. Thus, the sum of the payoﬀs over all players is v(N). On the
other hand, in the bidding mechanism, the amount of the value that players obtain changes
if someone rejects an oﬀer, for example, if an oﬀer made by proposer α is rejected at t=3,
the proposer obtains v(α) and the remaining players divide the value v(N\α) among them.
Generally, v(α) + v(N\α) ̸= v(N).
In situation in which players discuss how to allocate the outcome generated by cooperation
before they decide to cooperate or not, the setting in the bidding mechanism is appropriate. On
the other hand, in the situation in which players discuss how to allocate the outcome that has
already been generated by cooperation, the setting in our non-cooperative game is appropriate.
When we consider the game in which cooperation among players generates a positive eﬀect,
the position of the proposer diﬀers in our non-cooperative game and the bidding mechanism.
In our non-cooperative game, once chosen as a proposer, he obtains the value of his stand
alone coalition in any SPE since then. Whereas, in the bidding mechanism, once chosen as a
proposer, he obtains the value of the grand coalition minus the value of coalition including all
players except him in any SPE since then. In our non-cooperative game, being chosen as a
proposer is undesirable and the interpretation of the bidding in SPEs is compensation of being
chosen as a proposer, while in the bidding mechanism, being chosen as a proposer is desirable
and the interpretation of the bidding in SPEs is expenditure of being chosen as a proposer.
Our result can be generalized to the Owen value of cooperative games with coalition struc-
tures (Owen (1977)). Vidal-Puga and Berganti˜ nos (2003) generalized the bidding mechanism
to implement the Owen value as an equilibrium payoﬀ. However, their result works only on the
class of strictly superadditive games. Appropriate generalization of our non-cooperative game
can implement the Owen value on the class of all games.
Acknowledgment: The authors thank Rodica Branzei for her helpful comments.
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